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CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES AND
CORPORATE COMPETITION IN ILLINOIS:
A COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION OF
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
WILLIAM LYNCH SCHALLER*
No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one, and
love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Loyalty and betrayal are major themes of life and law. One
can find this throughout literature and history,2 and one can
certainly find it in lawsuits and law reports.3 Given its pride of
place in the world of human harm, disloyalty’s damage is often as
incalculable as it is incomparable.4
Illinois courts have long understood how vulnerable firms are
to fiduciary disloyalty, and they frequently call upon
noncompetition agreements and trade secret law to remedy it.5
* Partner, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago, Illinois. This Article is dedicated to my
wife Jane Reynolds Schaller—loyalty and love personified—for making me
better in every way.
1. Dickson v. People ex rel. Brown, 17 Ill. 191, 193 (1855) (quoting
Matthew 6:24 for this “revealed truth”).
2. See, e.g., GABRIELLA TURNATURI, BETRAYALS: THE UNPREDICTABILITY
OF HUMAN RELATIONS 26 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., Univ. Chi. Press 2007)
(“In literature and in history from Judas to our own day, there are no positive
figures of traitors or betrayers (except for Flavius Josephus, who is credited
with using betrayal for good ends), and no instances of betrayals that are not
attributable to evil or to some sort of perversion.”).
3. Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability,
104 NW. L. REV. 853, 915 n.1 (2010) (noting that for the period from 2000 to
2005, a Westlaw pleading search for the words “loyalty/disloyalty” within the
same sentence as “director/officer” turned up 2405 complaints).
4. See Christina Le Beau, A Betrayal of Trust, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Apr. 10,
2006,
at
39,
available
at
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20060408/ISSUE02/100025628/abetrayal-of-trust (recounting shock and sense of betrayal small firm founders
experienced when one of their trusted employees lied about leaving to
compete).
5. See Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, 965 N.E.2d
393 (2011) (holding that Illinois Appellate Court’s entire noncompete
jurisprudence over the last 30 years is at odds with Illinois Supreme Court’s
recent Mohanty decision); Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 225 Ill. 2d
52, 78, 866 N.E.2d 85, 100 (2006) (enforcing physician restrictive covenants as
1
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But the principal weapons they deploy to combat disloyalty are the
corporate opportunity doctrine and its close cousin, the corporate
competition prohibition.6 Indeed, corporate opportunity and
corporate competition claims are actually far more powerful than
their restrictive covenant and trade secret counterparts, as these
fiduciary duty theories do not require proof of an agreement,
evidence of secrecy measures, or other factual and legal clutter
that tends to derail contract and trade secret charges.7 Moreover,
under the deterrence rationale of these doctrines, fiduciaries bear
the heavy burden of proving their full disclosure, complete loyalty,
and utmost good faith during their agency relationships—a burden
they can seldom meet when challenged.8 In addition, fiduciary
breach claims are creatures of equity and hence not subject to jury
trials and their attendant expense and delay.9
Despite their similarities and considerable overlap, corporate
opportunity and corporate competition cases differ in important
respects. For one thing, their liability standards are not the same:
unless a fiduciary can show he disclosed and tendered a corporate
opportunity, he is foreclosed from seizing it under the prophylactic
Illinois “line-of-business” test.10 By contrast, a fiduciary can never
compete with his principal, regardless of his disclosure and
reasonable); Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 79 Ill. 2d 475, 478-79,
404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (1980) (summarizing Illinois common law trade secret
principles prior to the adoption of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act in 1987); ILG
Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 49 Ill. 2d 88, 94-95, 273 N.E.2d 393, 397 (1971) (upholding
production injunction barring manufacture of entire product to prevent use of
trade secret components); Stathis v. Geldermann, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 844,
858, 692 N.E.2d 798, 808 (1st Dist. 1998) (recognizing conversion claim with
respect to intangible assets).
6. Jodi L. Popofsky, Note, Corporate Opportunity and Corporate
Competition: A Double-Barreled Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1193 (1982) (comparing and contrasting corporate opportunity and
corporate competition doctrines in terms of liability, defenses and remedies).
7. See, e.g., Citadel Inv. Group, LLC v. Teza Techs., LLC, 398 Ill. App. 3d
724, 735-36, 924 N.E.2d 95, 105-06 (1st Dist. 2010) (even though defendants’
nine-month employment noncompete agreements were enforceable, and even
though defendants were in breach of those covenants for eight months, court
refused to extend covenant restraint period to remedy defendants’
noncompliance); Ancraft Prods. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., Inc., 84 Ill.
App. 3d 836, 405 N.E.2d 1162 (1st Dist. 1980) (rejecting trade secret theft,
tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims in a case that should have
been brought under the corporate opportunity doctrine).
8. See, e.g., Labovitz v. Dolan, 189 Ill. App. 3d 403, 413, 545 N.E.2d 304,
311 (1st Dist. 1989) (when there is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, “the
burden of proof shifts to the fiduciary to show by clear and convincing evidence
that a transaction is equitable and just.”).
9. Prodromos v. Everen Sec., Inc., 389 Ill. App. 3d 157, 173-75, 906 N.E.2d
599, 613-15 (1st Dist. 2009) (collecting Illinois cases holding there are no jury
trial rights in fiduciary duty cases).
10. Kerrigan v. Unity Savings Ass’n, 58 Ill. 2d 20, 28, 317 N.E.2d 39, 43-44
(1974).
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tender.11 Another important difference is that the “preparing to
compete” defense, so common in corporate competition cases,12 has
no role in true corporate opportunity cases.13 Remedies in these
cases vary as well: compensation forfeiture should be virtually
automatic in corporate competition cases but not necessarily in
corporate opportunity cases,14 while the “head start” relief
limitation should be ignored in corporate opportunity cases but not
necessarily in corporate competition cases.15 As one might guess,
these subtle substantive and remedial distinctions have significant
procedural ramifications in turn.16
In this Article, I primarily provide a descriptive rather than
prescriptive approach to Illinois corporate opportunity and
corporate competition principles, as I think most of the rules are
well settled even if not always well articulated or well understood,
particularly in relation to one another. To this end, I begin with
the scope and consequences of fiduciary status, including special
burdens of proof and significant remedies designed to implement
the fiduciary deterrence rationale. I then study the definitional
contours of corporate opportunity and corporate competition cases
in Illinois to show their differing elements and factual
applications. These differences are most pronounced—and most
misunderstood—with respect to the preparing to compete and
head start defenses, so I spend some time on these key subjects. I
end with a procedural emphasis: how a fiduciary duty case is
framed can and should lead to summary determinations of liability
11. Patient Care Servs., S.C. v. Segal, 32 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1028-29, 337
N.E.2d 471, 478 (1st Dist. 1975).
12. Radiac Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Techs., Inc., 177 Ill. App. 3d 628,
630, 638, 532 N.E.2d 428, 429, 434 (2d Dist. 1988) (finding employees were
legitimately preparing to compete before resignation in corporate competition
case).
13. Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Drecoll, 955 F. Supp. 849, 864 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(rejecting preparing to compete defense in corporate opportunity case).
14. See Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 312-13, 321 N.E.2d 1, 14 (1974)
(granting compensation forfeiture in corporate opportunity/corporate
competition case); White Gates Skeet Club, Inc. v. Lightfine, 276 Ill. App. 3d
537, 538, 658 N.E.2d 864, 866 (2d Dist. 1995) (granting compensation
forfeiture in corporate opportunity case).
15. Compare LCOR, Inc. v. Murray, No. 97 C 1302, 1997 WL 136278, at
*12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 1997) (granting preliminary injunction, without time
limitation, to remedy corporate opportunity usurpation), with Regal-Beloit
Corp., 955 F. Supp. at 867 (limiting head start injunction to six months,
without citing any authority for this time limitation, in corporate opportunity
case), and ABC Trans National Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders,
Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 817, 834-35, 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1312-13 (1st Dist. 1980)
(limiting damages to the four-month head start defendants gained in corporate
competition case).
16. Unichem Corp. v. Gurtler, 148 Ill. App. 3d 284, 290, 498 N.E.2d 724,
728 (1st Dist. 1986) (affirming trial court’s grant of summary judgment, on
liability, in favor of plaintiff, in fiduciary duty/corporate competition case).
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and certain remedies in favor of plaintiffs, a risk defendants rarely
appreciate at the time of their conduct.
This Article has a larger purpose. It is the first of three in
which I examine dimensions of the Illinois corporate opportunity
doctrine in an effort to clarify and extend this essential law in a
crucial way: by eliminating the third party “refusal to deal”
defense. My intent in this initial piece is to establish a baseline for
my next article, in which I painstakingly analyze Illinois corporate
opportunity cases in chronological order, focusing in every instance
on the often critical yet unremarked role third parties played in
the underlying events and the ultimate outcome, almost always
taking the form of their willingness or unwillingness to deal with
the plaintiff.17 Building on these first two works, my third will
argue for the abolition of the “third party refusal to deal” defense
in Illinois corporate opportunity cases as a matter of precedent
and policy—an argument that, if accepted, will give true force to
the deterrence rationale behind this pivotal regime.18
II. CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY AND CORPORATE COMPETITION:
RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND RATIONALES
To understand corporate opportunity and corporate
competition claims, one must first appreciate the capaciousness of
Illinois fiduciary duty law—it covers a much wider range of
players than many initially realize, from outside directors down to
mere employees. One must also appreciate the total deterrence
policy of fiduciary duty law and the stinging remedies it provides,
such as compensation forfeiture, prime rate prejudgment interest,
and wrongful gains disgorgement, all available even when the
victimized principal has suffered no loss.19 In addition, one must
grasp the distinction between corporate opportunity usurpation
and corporate competition, including the important point that
“preparing to compete” and “head start”—frequently asserted
defenses to corporate competition claims—are not defenses to
corporate opportunity claims. Taken together, these dynamics
should produce summary liability determinations and partial or
total relief awards in favor of plaintiffs almost as a matter of
course in Illinois corporate opportunity cases, especially when

17. William Lynch Schaller, The Origin and Evolution of the Third Party
“Refusal to Deal” Defense in Illinois Corporate Opportunity Cases
(forthcoming).
18. William Lynch Schaller, Corporate Opportunities and the Third Party
“Refusal to Deal” Defense: Policy and Practice Lessons from Illinois
(forthcoming).
19. See generally, William Lynch Schaller, Unfair Competition by
Fiduciaries: Inflicting the “Sting of Disability”, BUS. TORTS LIT., Winter 2010,
at 4 (discussing examples of multi-million dollar monetary awards and other
relief in fiduciary duty cases).
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fiduciaries compete for a corporate opportunity.
A. Who Is a “Fiduciary”?
Illinois decisions routinely recognize certain relationships as
fiduciary in nature. Familiar examples include trustees,
guardians, executors, administrators, attorneys, joint venturers,
and partners. Officers, directors, and sometimes even shareholders
of corporations are also recognized as fiduciaries.20 Members or
managers of Illinois limited liability companies may also be
fiduciaries, depending upon whether the entity is organized as
member managed or manager managed.21 Public officials have
20. See Autotech Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Automationdirect.com, 471 F.3d 745,
748 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Fiduciary duties exist as a matter of law in certain
relationships including partnerships and joint ventures.”); Ill. Rockford Corp.
v. Kulp, 41 Ill. 2d 215, 224, 242 N.E.2d 228, 234 (1968) (a fiduciary
relationship existed between shareholders in two-man corporation); Carroll v.
Caldwell, 12 Ill. 2d 487, 498, 147 N.E.2d 69, 75 (1957) (joint venturers, as a
matter of law, stand in a fiduciary relation to each other as to matters within
the scope of the relation); Santella v. Kolton, 393 Ill. App. 3d 889, 901-03, 912
N.E.2d 1248, 1259-60 (1st Dist. 2009) (removal of directors for breach of
fiduciary duty, including usurpation of a corporate opportunity in the form of
title to key trademarks, did not constitute an immediately appealable
interlocutory injunction order); Obermaier v. Obermaier, 128 Ill. App. 3d 602,
609-10, 470 N.E.2d 1047, 1053-54 (1st Dist. 1984) (majority shareholder
breached fiduciary duties in negotiating a deal that allowed him to receive
more for his shares from a buyer than minority shareholder received); Graham
v. Mimms, 111 Ill. App. 3d 751, 760-61, 444 N.E.2d 549, 555 (1st Dist. 1982)
(listing common categories of fiduciaries); Lyman Johnson and Dennis Garvis,
Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105,
1106-08 (2009) (noting paucity of law and literature on officer fiduciary
duties); Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209
(2005) (examining anew the assumptions behind treating partners as
fiduciaries); William Lynch Schaller, Competing After Leaving: Fiduciary
Duties of Closely Held Corporation Shareholders After Hagshenas v. Gaylord,
84 ILL. B.J. 354 (1996) (criticizing Illinois decisions analogizing closely held
corporations to partnerships and imposing partner-like fiduciary duties upon
mere shareholders); ANTHONY BIANCO, THE BIG LIE: SPYING, SCANDAL, AND
ETHICAL COLLAPSE AT HEWLETT-PACKARD 208-313 (PublicAffairs 2010) (booklength analysis of public company director infighting at Hewlett-Packard,
originating with director leaks, followed by improper “pretexting”
investigation, and ending with resignations or terminations of multiple
directors and in-house lawyers).
21. See, e.g., Moede v. Pochter, 710 F. Supp. 2d 683, 686 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(non-manager members did not breach limited liability company operating
agreement by not informing another member of member-manager’s breach);
Trover v. 419 OCR, Inc., 397 Ill. App. 3d 403, 408-10, 921 N.E.2d 1249, 125455 (5th Dist. 2010) (limited liability company was not required to participate
in arbitration over breach of fiduciary duty and corporate waste by members;
limited liability company was not a signatory to the members’ arbitration
agreement); Katris v. Carroll, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 1146, 842 N.E.2d 221, 226
(1st Dist. 2005) (member who was not a manager of a manager-managed
limited liability company owed no fiduciary duties, and therefore did not usurp
corporate opportunity in preparing rival software program for another firm);
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similarly been deemed fiduciaries in Illinois, thereby precluding
them from using their public positions for private gain.22 More
generally, “[e]very person who accepts the responsibility of acting
on behalf of another is a fiduciary.”23 Indeed, “[w]hen a principalagent relationship is present, a fiduciary relationship arises as a
matter of law.”24
Agency law is of obvious importance to business
organizations, since all businesses act through their agents. For
this reason, managers and employees are fiduciaries as a matter of
law to the extent they serve as agents of their employer.25 The
Anest v. Audino, 332 Ill. App. 3d 468, 475-76, 773 N.E.2d 202, 209 (2d Dist.
2002) (Illinois Limited Liability Company Act originally adopted corporate law
fiduciary duty principles for members and managers, and now explicitly
imposes such duties by amendment).
22. See, e.g., Chi. Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 564, 402 N.E.2d
181, 186 (1980) (constructive trust can be imposed upon benefits obtained by
third persons through their knowledge of or involvement in a public official’s
breach of fiduciary duty); City of Chi. ex rel. Cohen v. Keane, 64 Ill. 2d 559,
563-64, 357 N.E.2d 452, 455 (1976) (recognizing cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty against alderman who voted for public purchase of private land
he owned); Vill. of Wheeling v. Stavros, 89 Ill. App. 3d 450, 454, 411 N.E.2d
1067, 1070 (1st Dist. 1980) (“A constructive trust may be imposed upon
benefits obtained by a third person through his knowledge of or involvement
in a public official’s breach of fiduciary duty.”).
23. Graham, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 760, 444 N.E.2d at 555; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1.01 (2006) (defining agency as “the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests
assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s
behalf and be subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent
or otherwise consents so to act”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §1(1)
(1958) (“Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation
of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”). Illinois courts have
repeatedly rejected the argument that officers and directors of corporate
fiduciaries are themselves fiduciaries, however. See 1515 N. Wells, LP v. 1513
N. Wells, LLC, 392 Ill. App. 3d 863, 873, 913 N.E.2d 1, 20 (1st Dist. 2009)
(Illinois rejects the view that controlling shareholders have a fiduciary duty);
Franz v. Calaco Dev. Corp., 352 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1137, 818 N.E.2d 357, 366
(2d Dist. 2004) (chief operating officer cannot be held liable for breach of
fiduciary duty without piercing the corporate veil).
24. Stathis, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 859, 692 N.E.2d at 809; see also Ray v.
Winter, 67 Ill. 2d 296, 304, 367 N.E.2d 678, 682 (1977) (“Where, however, one
voluntarily acts as an agent for another, a fiduciary relationship exists as a
matter of law.”); Prodromos, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 724-25, 793 N.E.2d at 156-57
(agency relationship does not depend on an express appointment or acceptance
by the principal and agent, and no fee agreement or engagement letter is
necessary to create an agency relationship).
25. Foodcomm Int’l v. Barry, 328 F.3d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying
Illinois law) (employees, as agents, are fiduciaries who cannot compete before
resigning); E.J. McKernan Co. v. Gregory, 252 Ill. App. 3d 514, 530, 623
N.E.2d 981, 993-94 (2d Dist. 1993) (an employee need not be an officer or a
director to be held accountable as a fiduciary under agency law); Lowell
Wadmond, Conflicts of Business Interests, 17 BUS. LAW. 48, 49 (1961) (“The
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Illinois Supreme Court settled this question in 1883 in Davis v.
Hamlin.26 The court there explicitly rejected the argument that
fiduciary duty law does not apply to “master and servant, or
employer and employe[e],” stressing that “[t]he subject is not
comprehended within any such narrowness of view.”27 The Illinois
Supreme Court still holds this expansive view,28 as well it should
given the pervasive use of agents in all forms of business.
The consequence of fiduciary status is equally clear: agents
owe their principal a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty. “Under
standard agency doctrine [an agent] is obligated to act solely for
the benefit of [his principal] in all matters connected with his
agency, and to refrain from competing with [his principal].”29
These bedrock obligations, set forth in Sections 387 and 393 of the
venerable Restatement (Second) of Agency, have been explicitly
and repeatedly embraced by the Illinois Supreme Court, and they
serve as the basis for the corporate opportunity and corporate
competition doctrines.30
Less well understood, but equally important, is the difference
between an agent’s affirmative duty to seek business for the firm
and his negative duty not to interfere with the firm’s business. The
scope of an agency can be broad or narrow, according to the
parties’ agreement;31 not all agents are charged with finding new
customers, new employees, or new technology for the firm, for
relation between an employee and his employer, where the employee’s duties
are purely ministerial and mechanical, is normally described as that of master
and servant. However, as soon as we reach that level of employee-employer
relationship in which the employee’s job involves discretion and decision
making—and this of course would include all key employees and officers—the
relationship is more aptly described as that of principal and agent.”).
26. Davis v. Hamlin, 108 Ill. 39 (1883).
27. Id. at 48.
28. Lawlor v. N. Am. Corp., 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 69, __ N.E.2d __, __ (2012)
(“Employees as well as officers and directors owe a duty of loyalty to their
employer.”); Mullaney, Wells & Co. v. Savage, 78 Ill. 2d 534, 546, 402 N.E.2d
574, 580 (1980) (acknowledging that its prior corporate opportunity decisions
happened to have involved officers and directors, and then holding that
employee Savage was a fiduciary of plaintiff by virtue of his agency status,
even though he was not an officer or director of plaintiff).
29. Mullaney, 78 Ill. 2d at 546, 402 N.E.2d at 580.
30. Id. at 546-47, 402 N.E.2d at 580 (invoking corporate opportunity
doctrine and citing §§ 387 and 393); Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 305,
321 N.E.2d 1, 10 (1974) (invoking corporate opportunity doctrine by name,
invoking corporate competition doctrine in substance, and citing §§ 387 and
393).
31. Armstrong v. Guigler, 174 Ill. 2d 281, 294, 673 N.E.2d 290, 296-97
(1996) (discussing express and implied fiduciary duties and the “unique
character” of fiduciary duties in general); Kinzer v. City of Chicago, 128 Ill. 2d
437, 445, 539 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (1989) (fiduciary duties are the product of
contract, agency and equity law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13
(1958) (“An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his
agency.”).
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example.32 A case in point is Blackman Kallick Bartelstein v.
Sorkin.33 There, the court held that Sorkin, an accounting firm
employee, had no fiduciary duty to seek out financial investment
work from a client for whom his firm only did accounting work.
The court therefore rejected a claim that Sorkin had a duty to
report an investment opportunity to his employer just because the
opportunity was presented by a firm client.
Particular agents may have no duty to pursue or report new
work, as in Sorkin, but all agents are duty bound to refrain from
hindering their firm’s efforts.34 Although many Illinois Appellate
Court decisions readily recognize that officers and directors must
avoid hindering or exploiting their employer’s business, they
frequently imply—but do not quite state—that mere employees
are free to do so.35 This officer-director/employee distinction cannot

32. Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 1147, 842 N.E.2d at 226 (employee
Doherty, who was a member but not a manager of the manager-managed
limited liability company therein, did not become a fiduciary of the company
for corporate opportunity purposes when he was elected “Director of
Technology,” as he had no managerial authority); Dolezal v. Plastic and
Reconstructive Surgery, S.C., 266 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1086, 640 N.E.2d 1359,
1369 (1st Dist. 1994) (employer knew of and acquiesced in employee’s
operation of competing satellite medical office).
33. Blackman Kallick Bartlestein v. Sorkin, 214 Ill. App. 3d 663, 574
N.E.2d 121 (1st Dist. 1991).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (agent’s duty to “act solely
for the benefit of principal in all matters connected with agency”); Id. at § 389
(agent’s “duty not to deal with his principal as an adverse party in a
transaction connected with agency without principal’s knowledge”); Id. at
§ 391 (agent’s duty not to act on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction
connected with his agency without principal’s knowledge); Id. at § 392 (agent
acting for two principals, with the knowledge of both, has a duty of fairness to
each and must disclose all facts which would reasonably affect their
judgment); Id. at § 393 (agent has a “duty not to compete with [his] principal
concerning the subject matter of his agency”); Id. at §394 (agent has a “duty
not to act or to agree to act during the period of his agency for persons whose
interests conflict with those of [his] principal in matters in which the agent is
employed”); Id. at § 395 (agent has a duty not to use or disclose his
confidential information “given him by [his] principal or acquired by him
during the course or on account of his agency or in violation of his duties as an
agent, in competition with or to the injury of [his] principal, on his own
account or on behalf of another,” even if “such information does not relate to
the transaction in which he is then employed”).
35. See, e.g., Bernstein and Grazian, P.C. v. Grazian and Volpe, P.C., 402
Ill. App. 3d 961, 978 n.7, 931 N.E.2d 810, 825 n.7 (1st Dist. 2010) (“The law is
clear that employees are held to different standards with respect to fiduciary
duties than are corporate officers. Generally, an employee’s duty is one of
loyalty and noncompetition, while an officer’s duty is not to actively exploit the
company for his personal gain or hinder its ability to continue its business.”);
Cooper Linse Hallman Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Hallman, 368 Ill. App. 3d 353,
357, 856 N.E.2d 585, 589 (1st Dist. 2006) (corporate officers “stand on a
different footing” than employees when it comes to pre-resignation competitive
activities); E.J. McKernan, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 530, 623 N.E.2d at 994 (holding
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be squared with Mullaney, Wells & Co v. Savage36, where the
Illinois Supreme Court made a point of holding that, even though
Savage was just an employee, and not an officer or director, he still
had a duty “to act solely for the benefit of [his principal] in all
The
officermatters
connected
with
his
agency.”37
director/employee distinction also cannot be reconciled with Davis
v. Hamlin,38 where the Illinois Supreme Court specifically held
that employees cannot interfere with their employer’s business.39
Surely sabotage by any employee, from highest to lowest, is not an
act “for the benefit” of the employer, and it therefore should not be
permitted by Illinois fiduciary duty law under any
circumstances.40
There is only one place where the officer-director/employee
distinction arguably may make some sense: the affirmative duty to
protect the corporation. In Unichem Corp. v Gurtler,41 for example,
Gurtler, the president of Unichem, looked the other way as his
son—a Unichem employee—set up a rival firm. The court affirmed
summary judgment against Gurtler for breach of fiduciary duty,
holding that Gurtler had a duty to disclose facts which threatened
the plaintiff corporation’s existence. This result can be justified on
the ground that the scope of agency for an officer or director
includes overseeing the overall operations of the firm, a rationale
that applies with equal force to the narrower regime a manager
runs, such as supervising his subordinates.42 A mere employee, on
the other hand, has no supervisory responsibilities at all and,
therefore, arguably has no fiduciary obligation to blow the whistle
that officers may be liable for transactions after termination of employment if
such transactions are based on information gained during employment,
without clarifying that ordinary employees are held to the same standard);
Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 243 Ill. App. 3d 153, 160-61, 611 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (1st
Dist. 1993) (“The law governing the right of former employees to compete is
distinct from and irrelevant to a breach of fiduciary duty claim against
officers.”).
36. Mullaney, 78 Ill. 2d 534, 546, 402 N.E.2d 574.
37. Id. at 546, 402 N.E.2d at 580.
38. Davis, 108 Ill. 39.
39. Id. at 48.
40. LCOR Inc., 1997 WL 136278 (fiduciary purposely failed to forward his
principal’s deal papers to deal counterparty; fiduciary then falsely told the
deal counterparty that his principal wanted him to lie to the counterparty
about why the deal was being delayed; and then fiduciary subsequently
tendered his own competing deal to the counterparty); Lawlor, 2012 IL 112530
at *69, __ N.E.2d at __ (“Accordingly, a fiduciary cannot act inconsistently
with his agency or trust and cannot solicit his employers’ customers for
himself.”).
41. Unichem, 148 Ill. App. 3d 284, 498 N.E.2d 724 (1st Dist. 1986).
42. Golden v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 299 Ill. App. 3d 982, 990, 702
N.E.2d 581, 587 (1st Dist. 1998) (“[A]n agent is a fiduciary with respect to
matters within the scope of his agency.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 13 (1958))).
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on fellow employees engaged in wrongdoing.43 But even this low
level employee question is not free from doubt, as some cases have
imposed upon employees an affirmative duty to disclose their
knowledge of competitors’ conduct, particularly when they
themselves are participating in such competitive activities under
the guise of “preparation.”44
The default expectation for officers, full-time employees and
most agents assumes exclusive loyalty to the principal, and this
has been the general pattern of Illinois corporate opportunity
cases. But there can be circumstances in which the parties do not
expect exclusive loyalty, as might be the case when a director
serves on multiple boards of companies within the same general
industry, perhaps as a result of overlapping start-up, venture
capital or private equity investments.45 Those in this position
would do well to clarify their relationships and their corresponding
fiduciary duties via written agreements.46 For example, in Dremco,
43. Cf. Graham, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 761, 444 N.E.2d at 556 (“Among other
factors, the precise nature and intensity of the duty of loyalty depends upon
the degree of independent authority exercised by the fiduciary and the
reasonable expectations of the parties at the beginning of the relationship.”).
44. Regal-Beloit, 955 F. Supp. at 864 n.8 (even if employees’ “conduct could
be regarded merely as preparation for competition, that conduct was
actionable to the extent it directly conflicted with [their employer] RegalBeloit’s interests—specifically Regal-Beloit’s interest in acquiring Brad Foote
for itself”); Standard Brands v. U.S. Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp.
161, 171-72 (E.D. Wis. 1961) (“Protection of the principal’s interest requires a
full disclosure of acts undertaken in preparation for entering into
competition”); Fowler v. Varian Assocs., Inc.,196 Cal. App. 3d 34, 42, 241 Cal.
Rptr. 539, 543-44 (6th Dist. 1987) (“Fowler had an acknowledged obligation to
share with his employer information about competitors’ plans”—including a
competitor he was organizing).
45. See, e.g., Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 901 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting that
courts must consider that individuals often serve on several boards and are
subject to competing fiduciary duties); Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 404
F.3d 1088, 1096 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting this holding in Burg); Fronk v. Fowler,
923 N.E.2d 503, 515 (Mass. 2010) (rejecting limited partners’ business
opportunity claim where real estate limited partnership agreement expressly
allowed general partners to acquire other real estate business opportunities
without the limited partners); Miguel Bustillo & Joann S. Lublin, Board Ties
Begin to Trip Up Companies, WALL ST. J., April 8, 2010, at B1 (noting
“interlocking directorships” prohibition in the Clayton Act and commenting
that “[t]hese days, potential conflicts are popping up as hedge funds, privateequity firms and venture capitalists take significant positions in multiple, and
often, related companies”); Terence Woolf, Note, The Venture Capitalist’s
Corporate Opportunity Problem, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 473 (discussing
special corporate opportunity perils venture capitalists face when investing in
overlapping companies); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 436-43 (7th ed. 2012)
(discussing direct and indirect interlock limitations on service of directors and
officers, as imposed under § 8 of the Clayton Act and other laws).
46. E. Norman Veasey and Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters
Can a Director Serve?: A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors,
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Inc. v. South Chapel Gardens, Inc.47 the Illinois Appellate Court
held that a joint venture to develop a single property did not make
the joint venturers fiduciaries for purposes of developing another
property that happened to be nearby. The specificity of the parties’
contract, which plainly contemplated pursuit of a single property,
saved the Dremco defendant.
Contractual limits have their own limits when it comes to
fiduciaries, however. Illinois limited liability company members,
for example, cannot use contracts to totally eliminate their
fiduciary duties, though they can identify specific types or
categories of activities that do not violate fiduciary duties if not
manifestly unreasonable48—in sharp contrast to Delaware limited
liability company members, who enjoy the right to eliminate their
fiduciary duties by contract.49 Illinois limited liability company
members also cannot abolish their duty of good faith and fair
dealing, though they can set forth standards for measuring good
faith and fair dealing so long as those standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.50 These statutory restrictions are in
keeping with the general rule that fiduciary duties cannot be

63 BUS. LAW. 761 (2008) (discussing conflicting loyalties directors face in
serving their corporation and their constituent sponsors and questioning
whether these conflicts can be avoided through contracts).
47. Dremco, Inc. v. South Chapel Gardens, Inc., 274 Ill. App. 3d 534, 654
N.E.2d 501 (1st Dist. 1995).
48. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5(b)(6)(A) (2010); Thorpe v.
Levenfeld, No. 04 C 3040, 2005 WL 2420373, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2005)
(under the Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, an operating agreement
cannot “eliminate or reduce a member’s fiduciary duties, but may . . . identify
specific types or categories of activities that do not violate these duties, if not
manifestly unreasonable”).
49. 6 Del. Code 18-1101(e) (permitting contractual elimination of fiduciary
duties in Delaware limited liability companies, subject to the implied
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing); John M. Cunningham,
Reforming LLC Fiduciary Law: A Brief for the Unrepresented, BUS. L. TODAY,
Nov.–Dec.
2009,
at
51,
available
at
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2009-11-12/cunningham.shtml (briefly
noting conflicting fiduciary duty provisions found in state limited liability
company acts and then using Delaware law to exemplify proposed statutory
reforms to protect unrepresented members); Paul M. Altman and Srinivas M.
Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied Contractual Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1469 (2005)
(discussing Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and noting Delaware courts give
parties wide latitude to modify default fiduciary duties); Robb Tretter & Adam
M. Adler, Court Bars Derivative Suits Against LLC Managers: Del. Chancery
Relied on Language of LLC Act; Creditors of LLCs Will Need Contract to Bring
Such Suits, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 21, 2011, at 15 (describing ruling in CML V LLC
v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238 (Del. Ch. 2010), in which the court construed 6 Del. Code
18-1002 as limiting derivative action standing to limited liability members
and assignees).
50. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5(b)(7) (2010).
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waived in their entirety in advance via contract under Illinois
law.51
B. Deterrence Rationale Underlying Fiduciary Duty Law
Because it plays such a central role in business organizations,
fiduciary duty law fundamentally differs from other Illinois laws:
its primary purpose is deterrence of disloyalty, not simply
compensation of victims.52 This deterrence rationale was captured
colorfully and forcefully in Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust
Co.:
Nothing less than incapacity is able to shut the door to temptation,
where the danger is imminent and the security against discovery is
great. The wise policy of the law has therefore put the sting of
disability into the temptation, as a defensive weapon against the
strength of the danger which lies in the situation.53

Illinois courts have, therefore, explicitly rejected the
argument that loss must be shown before a conflict of interest
gives rise to relief against a fiduciary.54 Indeed, the public policy of
deterrence is so strong that Illinois courts have repeatedly
required fiduciaries to forfeit all compensation attributable to the

51. 1515 N. Wells, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 874, 913 N.E.2d at 11(“Nor is the
practice of imposing purported advance waivers of fiduciary duties in limited
partnership enterprises to be given judicial recognition.” (quoting Labovitz,
189 Ill. App. 3d at 417, 545 N.E.2d at 313)).
52. Vendo, 58 Ill. 2d 289 at 305-06, 321 N.E.2d at 10:
Plaintiff was not, as defendants urge, limited to the recovery of the
profits which accrued to Lektro-Vend. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 399, 401, 407 (1958)). The limitation on a plaintiff’s recovery
proposed by defendants would mean that a fiduciary could violate his
duty without incurring any risk. For if his misconduct were discovered
the most he could lose would be the profit gained from his illegal
venture; the law would have operated only to restore him to the same
position he would have been in had he faithfully performed his duties.
Id.; Graham, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 762-63, 444 N.E.2d at 557.
This “inveterate and uncompromising” application of the constructive
trust remedy “does not rest upon the narrow ground of injury or damage
to the corporation resulting from betrayal of confidence, but upon a
broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the purpose of
removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing
from a breach of the confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.”
Id. (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
53. Winger v. Chicago Bank & Trust Co., 394 Ill. 94, 116, 67 N.E.2d 265,
279 (1946) (quoting Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 Ill. 301, 366, 40 N.E. 362, 380-81
(1895)).
54. Keane, 64 Ill. 2d at 567-68, 357 N.E.2d at 456 (“As the cases already
discussed make clear, however, such a [loss] limitation cannot be imported
into either the statutes or the common law rule. To do so would plainly rob
them of their effectiveness.”) (citations omitted); Winger, 394 Ill. 94, 116, 67
N.E.2d at 278 (“Actual injury is not the principle upon which the law
proceeds.”).
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period of their disloyalty – independent of any loss by the victim or
any gain by the fiduciary.55
Furthering this deterrence philosophy is a strong resistance
to exceptions that might undercut it. The Illinois Appellate Court
drove home this point with special force in Paulman v. Kritzer56,
quoting Judge Cardozo’s famous observation in Meinhard v.
Salmon:
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
“disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions.57

To be sure, the Illinois Supreme Court shares this view,
having offered the very same Meinhard quote over a decade before
Paulman in its opinion in Bakalis v. Bressler.58
C. Special Burden of Proof on the Fiduciary
The importance of deterrence is also reflected in and
reinforced by special evidentiary rules, such as placing the burden
of clear and convincing proof on the fiduciary to segregate funds if
he has commingled his own with those of his principal,59 and
placing the same heightened burden of proof on the fiduciary to
show full disclosure and fairness as to questioned transactions.60
55. Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170, 175 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying
Illinois law) (requiring fiduciary to forfeit compensation for disloyalty, even
though plaintiff failed to prove any loss); Vendo, 58 Ill. 2d at 313-14, 321
N.E.2d at 14 (affirming compensation forfeiture of $170,835, in addition to
damages award of $7,345,000); Steinmetz v. Kern, 375 Ill. 616, 621, 32 N.E.2d
151, 154 (1941) (“In the application of this rule it makes no difference whether
the result of the agent’s conduct is injurious to the principal or not, as the
misconduct of the agent affects the contract from considerations of public
policy rather than of injury to the principal.”).
56. Paulman v. Kritzer, 74 Ill. App. 2d 284, 219 N.E.2d 541 (2d Dist. 1966).
57. Id. at 294, 219 N.E.2d at 546 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 161 N.E.
545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.)).
58. Bakalis v. Bressler, 1 Ill. 2d 72, 81-82, 115 N.E.2d 323, 328 (1953).
59. Winger, 394 Ill. at 111, 67 N.E.2d at 277 “[T]here is a duty resting upon
trustees not to commingle their own property with that of the beneficiaries . . .
and when they do so commingle, . . . the burden then rests upon the trustees
to show by strong and convincing evidence, the property, or the part thereof
that belonged to them before the commingling took place.” Id.; Graham, 111
Ill. App. 3d at 751, 444 N.E.2d at 549 (fiduciary has burden of proving
segregation as to commingled funds); James Barr Ames, Following
Misappropriated Property Into Its Product, 19 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1906)
(discussing early English and American tracing case law).
60. Shlensky v. S. Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 283, 166 N.E.2d
793, 801-02 (1960) (presumption of fraud attaches to self-dealing transactions;
interested directors have the burden of proving challenged transaction was
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The broad application of the these rules to all agents, from officers
and directors down to mere employees,61 and to all firms, from
corporations to partnerships to limited liability companies,62 is in
keeping with the “prophylactic purpose” of Illinois fiduciary duty
law.63
These special pleading and proof rules for self-dealing
transactions play a similar but secondary role in corporate
opportunity and corporate competition cases. Diversion of a
corporate opportunity is inherently unfair to the corporation,64 and
thus the “line-of-business” test adopted in Kerrigan v. Unity
Savings Association65 does not ask whether it was “fair” for the
fiduciary to divert the transaction from his corporation. Rather, as
discussed in more detail below, the line-of-business test shifts the
burden to the fiduciary to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the fiduciary disclosed and tendered the transaction to the
“fair” to their Illinois corporation); Doner v. Phoenix Joint Stock Land Bank,
381 Ill. 106, 114-15, 45 N.E.2d 20, 24-25 (1942) (agent who has profited by his
agency must prove his fidelity by “clear and convincing” evidence); Bakalis, 1
Ill. 2d at 81, 115 N.E.2d at 328 (“burden of proof was in fact upon the
defendant, because of the fiduciary relationship, to show by clear, convincing,
unequivocal and unmistakable evidence that he had been completely frank
and honest with his partner, had made full disclosure, and had not dealt
secretly behind his back”); Grossberg v. Haffenberg, 367 Ill. 284, 11 N.E.2d
359 (1937) (partner who obtained property from firm rebutted presumption of
fraud); LID Associates v. Dolan, 324 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 1061-63, 756 N.E.2d
866, 879-80 (1st Dist. 2001) (applying “fairness” test to three challenged
fiduciary transactions); Labovitz, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 413, 545 N.E.2d at 311
(when there is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, “the burden of proof shifts
to the fiduciary to show by clear and convincing evidence that a transaction is
equitable and just”).
61. Mullaney, 78 Ill. 2d at 534, 402 N.E.2d at 580 (fiduciary duty rules are
not limited to officers and directors; they apply to all agents); Davis, 108 Ill.
39, 48 (rejecting argument that fiduciary duty rules did not apply to relation of
“master and servant, or employer and employe[e]”); E. J. McKernan Co., 252
Ill. App. 3d at 530, 623 N.E.2d at 993 (“An employee need not be an officer or a
director to be accountable since an agent must act solely for the principal in all
matters related to the agency and refrain from competing with the principal.”).
62. Bakalis, 1 Ill. 2d at 72, 115 N.E.2d at 323 (managing partner breached
fiduciary duties in secretly acquiring in his own name real estate the
partnership leased and needed to survive); Anest, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 468, 773
N.E.2d at 202 (extending corporate opportunity doctrine to limited liability
company); Cf. Abdalla v. Qadorh-Zidan, 913 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. App. 2009)
(holding that common law fiduciary duties, similar to the ones imposed on
partnerships and closely-held corporations, are applicable to Indiana limited
liability companies); Patmon v. Hobbs, 280 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. App. 2009)
(holding that corporate opportunity doctrine applied to limited liability
company fiduciary duty dispute).
63. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 28, 317 N.E.2d at 43.
64. Eric G. Olinsky, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Interested Party
Director Transactions: A Framework for Analysis in an Attempt to Restore
Predictability, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451, 463, 513 (1999).
65. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 28, 317 N.E.2d at 43.
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corporation and that the corporation thereafter consented to the
fiduciary taking it for himself. These are demanding standards no
accused fiduciary has met in an Illinois corporate opportunity case
decided after Kerrigan; indeed, with the exception of the
discredited decision in Peterson Welding Supply Co. v. Cryogas
Products, Inc.,66 every time a fiduciary has won an Illinois
corporate opportunity case on liability after Kerrigan, the court
has failed to cite Kerrigan, its “line-of-business” test, or indeed any
corporate opportunity test at all.67 Corporate competition cases are
subject to even more exacting standards: competing on matters
connected with the agency relationship before resignation is
categorically unfair. As a result of these strict standards, only
waiver, release, abandonment, ratification, or similar affirmative
defenses can save the fiduciary in corporate opportunity and
corporate competition cases, and the fiduciary must meet the clear
and convincing proof standard when invoking these defenses.68
66. Peterson Welding Supply Co. v. Cryogas Products, Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d
759, 764, 467 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 (1st Dist. 1984); see Levy v. Markal Sales
Corp., 268 Ill. App. 3d 355, 368, 643 N.E.2d 1206, 1215-16 (1st Dist. 1994)
(Peterson Welding Supply does not correctly state Illinois law in light of
Kerrigan and subsequent Illinois Supreme Court corporate opportunity
decisions).
67. See, e.g., Prodromos, 389 Ill. App. 3d 157, 906 N.E.2d 599 (failing to
cite Kerrigan or any other corporate opportunity decision or test); Delta
Medical Systems, Inc. v. Mid-America Medical Systems, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 3d
777, 772 N.E.2d 768 (1st Dist. 2002) (failing to cite Kerrigan or any other
corporate opportunity decision or test).
68. Williams Electronic Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 580 (7th Cir.
2004) (employees had already been fired before release was negotiated, so they
were not fiduciaries at time of negotiations); MPC Containment Systems, Ltd.
v. Moreland, 2008 WL 1775501, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2008) (claim for
fiduciary breach must be waived or ratified deliberately by the corporation,
and the corporation’s decision must be specific as to the particular breach);
Borsellino v. Putnam, 2011 IL App (1st) 102242, ¶¶ 102-18, 962 N.E.2d 1000,
1019-24 (1st Dist. 2011) (release, entered into after initial corporate
opportunity litigation, barred subsequent corporate opportunity action);
Janowiak v. Tiesi, 402 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1006-08, 932 N.E.2d 569, 580-81 (1st
Dist. 2010) (trustee’s resignation did not automatically end his fiduciary duty
of full disclosure in connection with release); Lozman v. Putnam, 379 Ill. App.
3d 807, 884 N.E.2d 756 (1st Dist. 2008) (finding laches barred plaintiff’s
corporate opportunity claim); Goldberg v. Michael, 328 Ill. App. 3d 593, 766
N.E.2d 246 (2d Dist. 2002) (directors of and counsel for homeowner’s
association all had resigned years before association negotiated settlement
agreements and releases with them, so they were not fiduciaries at time of
negotiations); Golden, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 982, 702 N.E.2d at 581 (discussing
conflict of authority in Illinois as to whether a fiduciary relationship among
partners ceases upon dissolution of the partnership, as background to
analyzing enforceability of release secured by fiduciaries); Weisblatt v. Colky,
265 Ill. App. 3d 622, 625-26, 637 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 (1st Dist. 1994) (even
though attorney Colky still had an appearance on file for plaintiff in her
underlying divorce action, “the fact that Colky and plaintiff were engaged in
litigation [against one another], considered along with plaintiff’s acquisition of

Do Not Delete

16

2/9/2013 3:59 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:1

D. Remedies for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Illinois law provides significant relief against fiduciary
wrongdoers, including compensatory damages, disgorgement of
wrongful gains, constructive trusts, accountings, prime rate
prejudgment interest awards, forfeiture of salary and other
compensation, punitive damages, and of course preliminary and
permanent injunctions.69 Civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting,
and similar claims can extend such relief to reach those who assist
fiduciary malefactors.70 Moreover, under the “continuation” theory,
independent counsel to represent her in the transaction with Colky embodied
by the release, persuades us that she and Colky were no longer fiduciaries for
purposes of the transaction”); Peskin v. Deutsch, 134 Ill. App. 3d 48, 55, 479
N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (1st Dist. 1985) (“In appraising the validity of a release in
the context of a fiduciary relationship, the court must regard the defendant as
having the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the
transaction embodied in the release was just and equitable.”); Peterson
Welding, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 759, 467 N.E.2d at 1073, (finding laches barred
plaintiff’s corporate opportunity claim); Babray v. Carlino, 2 Ill. App. 3d 241,
276 N.E.2d 435 (1st Dist. 1971) (strict fiduciary duties apply even when
partners are negotiating dissolution of the partnership).
69. See, e.g., Funderburg v. Shappert, 23 Ill. 2d 220, 177 N.E.2d 845 (1961)
(imposing constructive trust on newspaper ownership interest fiduciary
acquired in breach of a confidential relationship); Caparos v. Morton, 364 Ill.
App. 3d 159, 845 N.E.2d 773 (1st Dist. 2006) (ordering complete forfeiture of
management fees paid by limited partnership during general partner’s three
years of disloyalty); Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 136 Ill. App. 3d 571, 483
N.E.2d 283 (1st Dist. 1985) (affirming nine-year permanent injunction for
breach of fiduciary duty); Hill v. Names & Addresses, Inc., 212 Ill. App. 3d
1065, 571 N.E.2d 1085 (1st Dist. 1991) (thorough discussion of damages and
disgorgement in fiduciary duty case); Sobel v. Franks, 261 Ill. App. 3d 670, 633
N.E.2d 820 (1st Dist. 1994) (ordering compensation forfeiture for disloyalty);
William Lynch Schaller, Disloyalty and Distrust: The Eroding Fiduciary
Duties of Illinois Employees, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1, 53-70 (1990) (detailed
analysis of Illinois fiduciary duty remedy case law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 407 (principal’s choice of remedies); Cf. Ryan v. Bd. of Tr., 236
Ill. 2d 315, 924 N.E.2d 970 (2010) (ordering forfeiture of former Illinois
Governor Ryan’s entire pension as a result of his criminal conviction in
connection with his public duties).
70. See, e.g., Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 46, 693 N.E.2d 358
(1998) (acknowledging civil conspiracy as a viable theory in breach of fiduciary
duty case); Mullaney, 78 Ill. 2d at 534, 402 N.E.2d at 574 (fiduciary, his secret
partner, and their new entity were all equally liable for the fiduciary’s
wrongdoing against his principal); Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 842 N.E.2d
221 (employee Doherty was not plaintiff’s fiduciary and therefore was free to
prepare rival software program for another firm; accordingly, Carroll and
Ernst could not collude with Doherty in usurping a corporate opportunity);
Multiut Corp. v. Draiman, 359 Ill. App. 3d 527, 834 N.E.2d 43 (1st Dist. 2005)
(rejecting wife’s “compliant spouse” argument and holding her equally liable
with her husband for civil conspiracy to breach fiduciary duties); Regnery v.
Meyers, 287 Ill. App. 3d 354, 364, 679 N.E.2d 74, 80 (1st Dist. 1997) (“A third
party who colludes with a fiduciary in committing a breach of duty, induces or
participates in such breach, and obtains the benefits therefrom is directly
liable to the aggrieved party.”); Stathis, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 700-01, 630 N.E.2d
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if an employee begins competing or usurping a corporate
opportunity before resigning, his resignation does not relieve
him—or those who assist him—from liability for his preresignation acts.71 The “continuation” theory also bars a fiduciary
and those who collude with him from undertaking a transaction
founded upon information acquired during his employment,
regardless of his resignation.72
Of particular importance is restitutionary relief in the form of
constructive trusts.73 A leading example of this remedy in a

at 933-34 (third party conspired with fiduciary to usurp a corporate
opportunity); Preferred Meal Sys. v. Guse, 199 Ill. App. 3d 710, 726, 557
N.E.2d 506, 516 (1st Dist. 1990) (“The judge was also in error in holding that
Excel, the company organized and principally financed by Guse, should also be
exempt from being enjoined, considering that it was the instrumentality
employed by all three individual defendants in implementing and perfecting
the breach of their [fiduciary] duty to Preferred.”); Magnus v. Lutheran Gen.
Health Care Sys., 235 Ill. App. 3d 173, 183, 601 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1st Dist.
1992) (a constructive trust is an appropriate remedy “where a third party has
been unjustly enriched due to knowingly acquiring property as the result of a
fiduciary’s breach of duty”); Zokoych v. Spalding, 36 Ill. App. 3d 654, 344
N.E.2d 805 (1st Dist. 1976) (holding bank liable for conspiring in codefendant’s breach of fiduciary duties); Patient Care Servs., 32 Ill. App. 3d at
1032, 337 N.E.2d at 481 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939))
(“We note in passing that it makes no difference whether or not the corporate
opportunity seizure took place at Segal’s personal behest or through the
vehicle of Segal’s corporation.”); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37
CALIF. L. REV. 539, 554 (1949) (discussing liability of third parties who receive
property from a fiduciary in breach of his duties, unless the third parties are
bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the breach).
71. E.J. McKernan Co., 252 Ill. App. 3d at 531, 623 N.E.2d at 994
(resignation does not sever employee’s fiduciary liability for transactions
begun before but completed after resignation); Cf. Abdalla, 913 N.E.2d 280
(adopting the analogous “shareholder termination rule,” under which
termination of the fiduciary relationship does not shield the fiduciary from his
duties or obligations concerning transactions which have their inception before
the termination of the relationship).
72. LCOR Inc., 1997 WL 136278, at *9 (“Moreover, even assuming
arguendo that Murray did not begin competing for River Run until after his
resignation, he would remain bound by his fiduciary duty not to undertake a
transaction founded on information acquired during his employment.”); MileO-Mo Fishing Club, Inc. v. Noble, 62 Ill. App. 2d 50, 57, 210 N.E.2d 12, 15 (5th
Dist. 1965) (“This rule applies not only to transactions consummated while the
fiduciary relation exists, but also to transactions consummated after it has
ended, if the transactions began during the existence of the relationship or
were founded on information or knowledge acquired during the relationship.”).
73. Keane, 64 Ill. 2d at 566-67, 357 N.E.2d at 456-57 (emphasizing that
restitution against a fiduciary does not require proof of loss by the principal);
Bakalis, 1 Ill. 2d at 82, 115 N.E.2d at 328 (requiring defendant partner to
transfer usurped real estate title to both partners as tenants in common;
requiring both partners to assume the property’s mortgage; requiring innocent
partner to reimburse defendant for half of what defendant paid for property;
and requiring defendant to account for half of real estate profits from the time
he diverted property to himself up to the date of the title transfer order);
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corporate opportunity action can be found in Paulman v. Kritzer.74
There a fiduciary acquired stock and real estate for himself that
should have been obtained for the corporation’s benefit. The court
ordered the fiduciary to transfer the diverted property to the
corporation, but conditioned the transfer upon the corporation (i)
reimbursing the fiduciary for the amount he had paid to secure the
property in his own name and (ii) indemnifying the fiduciary for
personal liability in connection with the challenged transactions. A
later case involving similar facts, White Gates Skeet Club, Inc. v.
Lightfine,75 went a step further and held that, although the
fiduciary was entitled to reimbursement of the amount he had
paid for the usurped real estate, he was not entitled to
prejudgment interest on that amount. Denying the fiduciary an
award of prejudgment interest on the returned money, the court
felt, was more consistent with the deterrence policy underpinning
fiduciary duty law.76
E. What Is a “Corporate Opportunity”?
Strictly speaking, corporate opportunity cases are
characterized by a particular and narrow fact pattern: (1) a third
party presents an identifiable, concrete deal relating to the
corporate employer’s business, such as the chance to purchase the
building housing the employer’s business; (2) the deal is a “zerosum” game in the sense that only the corporate employer or its
fiduciary—but not both—can seize it, leaving the loser
permanently shut out; and (3) the fiduciary diverts the deal to
himself, whether before or after his resignation. These
circumstances force the court to engage in an after-the-fact “what
if” inquiry: Would the corporate employer have been interested in
and able to pursue the opportunity if its fiduciary had disclosed all
the facts and tendered the opportunity?
This question should always be answered in the employer’s
favor if the opportunity falls within the employer’s “line of
Graham, 111 Ill. App. at 762, 444 N.E.2d at 556 (“When a fiduciary breaches
his duty of loyalty by misappropriating corporate assets, or by usurping
corporate opportunities, restitution can be compelled by means of a
constructive trust.”); Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club, Inc., 62 Ill. App. 2d at 58-59,
210 N.E.2d at 16 (ordering fishing club president and his wife to convey
diverted real estate to club upon club’s reimbursement of the sum president
paid for the property); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 (if an agent
receives anything of value as a result of his violation of his duty of loyalty, he
is subject to a liability to deliver it, its value, or its proceeds, to his principal).
74. Paulman v. Kritzer, 38 Ill. 2d 101, 230 N.E.2d 262 (1967).
75. White Gates Skeet Club, Inc. v. Lightfine, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 541-42,
658 N.E.2d at 868.
76. Id. at 541, 658 N.E.2d at 868 (“In the present case, we agree with the
club that the award of interest to the defendants, who breached their fiduciary
duty by usurping a corporate opportunity, would be against public policy.”).
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business,” a pro-employer test with a “prophylactic purpose” the
Illinois Supreme Court established in its leading corporate
opportunity opinion, Kerrigan v. Unity Savings Association.77
Under Kerrigan, a corporation’s “line of business” includes any
“business that is reasonably incident to its present or prospective
operations.”78 When such an opportunity arises, corporate
fiduciaries must fully disclose and timely tender the opportunity to
the corporation.79 Only if the corporation then declines the
opportunity may fiduciaries pursue it for themselves.80 If
fiduciaries fail to make such disclosure and to tender the
opportunity, the “prophylactic purpose” of the corporate
opportunity rule requires that the fiduciaries be foreclosed from
exploiting the opportunity for themselves.81
Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, even disclosure and tender
are not enough under Illinois law; to seize an opportunity, a
fiduciary also needs his principal’s consent.82 In Mullaney, Wells &
Co. v. Savage,83 for example, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
the notion that the employee-fiduciary, an investment banker,
could “begin to act on his own,” without plaintiff’s consent, while
still employed by plaintiff, with respect to an investment
opportunity that originated but faltered during his employment.84
Patient Care Services, S.C. v. Segal,85 involving a battle over a
hospital contract five years before Mullaney was decided, offered a
similar, if implicit, lack of consent holding in response to an
officer/director-fiduciary’s argument that he was free to pursue the
opportunity since his employer was aware of and simultaneously
pursuing the same contract.86 The very fact that the employer was
77. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 28, 317 N.E.2d at 44.
78. Id., 317 N.E.2d at 43.
79. Id. (“Since the individual defendants, as directors, admittedly
controlled Unity, the requisite disclosure and tender would necessarily have
had to be made to Unity’s shareholders.”).
80. Id. (“It may be conceded that if a corporation has been informed by a
director of a business opportunity, which it declines, the director may then be
free to pursue the opportunity himself.”); Levy, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 367, 643
N.E.2d at 1216 (“Therefore, Gust and Bakal could not take advantage of the
Apple opportunity without first offering it to Markal and having Markal reject
it.”).
81. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 29, 317 N.E.2d at 44.
82. William Lynch Schaller, Growing Pains: Intellectual Property
Considerations for Illinois Small Businesses Seeking to Expand, 35 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 845, 929 (2004) (noting Illinois Supreme Court’s “strict insistence on
full disclosure, timely tender, and clear consent”).
83. Mullaney, 78 Ill. 2d at 547, 402 N.E.2d at 581.
84. Id. at 549, 402 N.E.2d at 581 (“To accord Savage the option of
substituting himself as the investing party without the consent of the plaintiff
[principal] is to place him in a position where his personal interests will
conflict with his duties to his principal.”).
85. Patient Care Servs , 32 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 337 N.E.2d 471.
86. Id. at 1031, 337 N.E.2d at 480:
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seeking the contract for itself negated any good faith on the
fiduciary’s part and, one would think, any consent on the
employer’s part.87 To like effect was Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Drecoll,88
in which the court issued an injunction against employeefiduciaries who secretly sought to purchase the same business as
their employer; consent by the employer was obviously absent.
Taking the consent principle to its logical extreme, one would
expect fiduciary liability to attach even where the corporation
initially declines an opportunity but then changes its mind,89 as
occurred in Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker.90 This only makes
sense: after all, aside from the usual push and pull characteristic
of all negotiations and exemplified by Regal-Beloit and
Lindenhurst Drugs, disclosure of the fiduciary’s personal interest
in the opportunity in many instances would spur the corporation
to intervene and seize the opportunity for itself rather than face
competition by an ex-insider, the toughest competitor of all.91
Indeed, Kerrigan intimated a fiduciary must disclose his intent to
pursue an opportunity,92 Patient Care Services subsequently held
that a fiduciary’s disclosure of his intent to pursue an opportunity

Defendants’ case authority holding that a corporate officer or director
violates his fiduciary duty . . . by failing to inform the corporation of a
business opportunity he seized as his own has no applicability to the
present case. The cases cannot be inverted to hold that once he gives
notice he is ipso facto free to contest with the corporation the business
opportunity.
87. Id. at 1032, 337 N.E.2d at 480-81:
However, where an officer or director, as here, desires to seize the only
asset his financially solvent corporation presently possesses, when the
corporation has manifested its desire to retain it, and when the
corporation obviously needs to retain it, the mere fact that such officer
and director has announced his intention in advance to throw down the
gauntlet and do battle with his corporation over the opportunity will not
constitute good faith.
88. Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Drecoll, 955 F. Supp. at 862.
89. Cf. Pratt v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 100 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1938)
(ordering fiduciary to transfer property to his principal, even though principal
had previously rejected fiduciary’s recommendation that principal acquire the
property).
90. Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker, 154 Ill. App. 3d 61, 67, 506 N.E.2d
645, 650 (2d Dist. 1987) (rejecting defense argument that an admitted
corporate opportunity “later became an individual opportunity because of
plaintiff’s failure to pursue the opportunity”).
91. Laura Koss-Feder, The Worst Kind of Competition: Former Employees,
CRAIN’S
CHI.
BUS.,
June
13,
2005,
at
27,
available
at
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20050611/ISSUE02/100023841/theworst-kind-of-competition-former-employees (reporting small business owner’s
lament over loss of business to a former employee).
92. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 28, 317 N.E.2d at 43 (“In the present case,
however, no claim is made that Unity was informed of the possibility that it
might enter into the insurance business or of the intention of the defendants
to do so on their own if Unity did not.”).
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for himself does not by itself free the fiduciary to pursue the
opportunity,93 and Mullaney then followed these holdings with its
explicit requirement of principal consent.94 Thus, a fiduciary
should seldom take comfort from a principal’s seeming lack of
interest in a disclosed opportunity, as this does not necessarily
amount to abandonment95 and certainly does not amount to
consent.96 Express and implied consent are, accordingly, rarely
serious defenses in Illinois corporate opportunity cases.97
Although the “line-of-business” inquiry is the most common
basis for assessing corporate opportunity liability in Illinois, there
is an alternative ground: misappropriation of corporate property to
seize an opportunity. Use of company assets—like inside
information, personnel, cash, computers, or even simply company
time98—equitably estops a fiduciary from later denying the

93. Patient Care Servs., 32 Ill. App. 3d at 1031, 337 N.E.2d at 480 (“The
cases cannot be inverted to hold that once he gives notice he is ipso facto free
to contest with the corporation the business opportunity.”).
94. Mullaney, 78 Ill.2d at 549, 402 N.E.2d at 579 (“To accord Savage the
option of substituting himself as the investing party without the consent of the
plaintiff [principal] is to place him in a position where his personal interests
will conflict with his duties to his principal.”).
95. Vendo, 58 Ill. 2d at 306, 321 N.E.2d at 10.
We are not called on here to review the business prudence of plaintiff’s
decisions, however, and we cannot say that plaintiff would have declined
an offer to purchase the Lektro-Vend, with its advanced technology, or
to seek to develop such a machine itself had a genuine opportunity to do
so been extended to it.
Id.; Becker, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 70, 506 N.E.2d at 651 (2d Dist. 1987) (“[T]he
corporation’s unwillingness to take advantage of the opportunity in question
must be clearly manifested.”).
96. This is not to say that a principal may delay unreasonably in response
to a tender by the fiduciary. See, e.g., Spar Mountain Mining Co. v. Schwerin,
305 Ill. 309, 137 N.E. 245 (1922) (plaintiff mining company’s agent/general
manager, Scherwin, purchased real estate on own his account and
immediately tendered it to his principal on the same terms; plaintiff
unreasonably delayed for nearly one year thereafter—until it discovered that
valuable mineral rights were under the farm—before demanding that
Scherwin sell the property to plaintiff).
97. Goldberg, 328 Ill. App. 3d 593, 766 N.E.2d 246 (opportunity that was
fully disclosed and not within homeowners association’s line of business did
not constitute corporate opportunity); Dremco, Inc. v. South Chapel Gardens,
Inc., 274 Ill. App. 3d 534, 654 N.E.2d 501 (1st Dist. 1995) (joint venture
agreement, limited to a single property, did not restrict partner from
purchasing neighboring property for himself); Tarin v. Pellonari, 253 Ill. App.
3d 542, 625 N.E.2d 739 (1st Dist. 1993) (plaintiffs knew of defendants’ creation
of rival auto repair business yet delayed two years before suing them);
Northwestern Terra Cotta Corp. v. Wilson, 74 Ill. App. 2d 38, 219 N.E.2d 860
(1st Dist. 1966) (board of directors, after having been specifically notified that
shares could be purchased for $7 per share, determined that $7 was too high
and that corporation could not afford to pay it).
98. Comedy Cottage v. Berk, 145 Ill. App. 3d 355, 355-56, 495 N.E.2d 1006,
1007-08 (1st Dist. 1986) (fiduciary misused confidential company information
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opportunity fell within the corporation’s line of business, even if it
was not feasible for the corporation to pursue the opportunity.99
Indeed, even though the Illinois Supreme Court’s Kerrigan
decision is the fountainhead of “line of business” corporate
opportunity liability in Illinois, a careful reading of the case shows
it was also decided on asset misappropriation grounds.100 The
Kerrigan court specifically observed that the mortgage insurance
“referral” opportunities came to the defendants by virtue of their
positions as Unity’s directors and were created through Unity’s
lending activities: “those factors alone would in our opinion be
enough to fix liability upon defendants.”101 The Illinois Supreme
Court then held that asset misappropriation had occurred:
Whether the funneling of prospective customers to Plaza is regarded
as an appropriation of an asset of Unity, denominated as good will,
concerning lease renewal opportunity; the fact that this information did not
rise to the level of a trade secret did not negate the existence of a fiduciary
duty with respect to the lease transaction); Schaller, supra note 82, at 935
(collecting cases imposing fiduciary liability for misuse of company time,
computers, money and personnel). But see Cooper, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 362, 856
N.E.2d at 594 (excusing fiduciary’s misuse of company computers to prepare
business plan for rival start-up firm, on the ground that such “conduct did not
rise to the level of a breach of their fiduciary duties”—even though all Illinois
cases cited by the court held to the contrary with respect to such conduct);
Dionne Searcey, Some Courts Raise Bar on Reading Employee Email:
Companies Face Tougher Tests to Justify Monitoring Workers’ Personal
Accounts; Rulings Hinge on “Expectation of Privacy,” WALL ST. J., Nov. 19,
2009,
at
A17,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125859862658454923.html (discussing recent
Ninth Circuit and New Jersey cases recognizing employees’ privacy rights in
their personal emails on their employers’ computer systems, and noting that
the Ninth Circuit case was then on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, which later reversed in City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010));
Diane L. Webb, Waiver of Otherwise Privileged Communications by Use of
Workplace Computer Equipment and Systems, BUS. TORTS JOURNAL, Spring
2010, at 17 (canvassing cases accepting and rejecting employee privacy
assertions in connection with their communications with personal counsel on
company computers).
99. Graham, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 763:
Therefore, when a corporation’s fiduciary uses corporate assets to
develop a business opportunity, the fiduciary is estopped from denying
that the resulting opportunity belongs to the corporation whose assets
were misappropriated, even if it was not feasible for the corporation to
pursue the opportunity or it had no expectancy in the project.
100. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 23, 317 N.E.2d at 41 (defendant directors of
plaintiff Unity Savings leased Plaza Insurance Agency’s premises from Unity,
built Plaza’s mortgage insurance business with customers referred by Unity,
and advertised Plaza as an “agent” of Unity).
101. Id. at 29. The lower court decision made clear that borrowers were
required, under the terms of Unity’s loans, to insure their mortgaged real
estate against fire and other casualty. “The insurer had to be a responsible
one, acceptable to Unity.” Kerrigan v. Unity Savings Assoc., 11 Ill. App. 3d
766, 773, 297 N.E.2d 699, 704 (1st Dist. 1973).
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or whether it is regarded as an employment of Unity’s facilities
without compensation to it, the result is the same: The defendants
were actively exploiting their position as directors of Unity for their
personal benefit.102

The breadth of the “line-of-business” and “assetmisappropriation” tests is best understood against the alternative
tests the Illinois Supreme Court has not adopted. Courts in some
states follow the “interest-or-expectancy” test, and others embrace
the “fairness” test,103 both of which are less draconian than the
“line-of-business” and “asset-misappropriation” tests. The
“interest-or-expectancy” inquiry, invoked for example in Glasser v.
Essaness Theatres Corporation104 and Comedy Cottage, Inc. v.
Berk,105 asks whether the corporation would likely have been able
to secure the opportunity for itself based upon its existing rights or
something close to them, thereby limiting opportunities to those
very close to the corporation’s current activities.106 The “fairness”
inquiry, on display in Paulman v. Kritzer,107 weighs indeterminate
variables—the officer’s good faith, the degree of his disclosure, the
manner in which the offer was communicated to the officer, the
action taken by the corporation, and the need or interest of the
corporation in the opportunity—and is thus inherently
unpredictable in its application.108 By contrast, the “line-of102. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 29.
103. Popofsky, supra note 6, at 1197-1208 (surveying authorities addressing
“interest-or-expectancy” and “fairness” tests).
104. Glasser v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 414 Ill. 180, 192, 111 N.E.2d 124,
130 (1953).
105. Comedy Cottage, Inc. v. Berk, 145 Ill. App. 3d 355, 359-60, 495 N.E.2d
1006 (1st Dist. 1986).
106. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Corporate Opportunity and Comparative
Advantage, 84 IOWA L. REV. 211, 212 (1999) (“[U]nlike the “interest or
expectancy” test, the . . . [“line-of-business”] test does not require that the
corporation has previously done something to establish its rights in the
opportunity.”); Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic
Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277, 292
(1998) (“The ‘interest’ component of this approach refers to projects over which
the corporation has an existing contractual right. The ‘expectancy’ component
proscribes projects that, while not already secured through an express
contract, are likely, given current rights, to mature into contractual rights at
some future date.”).
107. Paulman, 74 Ill. App. 2d at 294, 219 N.E.2d at 541 (“Whether a
corporate officer has seized a corporate opportunity for his own depends not on
any single factor nor is it determined by any fixed standard.”), aff’d, 38 Ill. 2d
101, 230 N.E.2d 262 (1967).
108. Compare Eric Talley, supra note 104, at 293-95 (reviewing deficiencies
of the “fairness” test, including judicial inability to articulate exactly what
“fairness to the corporation” means); Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark,
A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1020 (1981)
(arguing that “case law gives. . .[‘fairness’] no principled content and seems
designed to leave the courts with boundless discretion. . .[thereby] generat[ing]
much uncertainty about the operational meaning of the legal rule, but no
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business” and “asset-misappropriation” tests, if triggered, result in
automatic liability in virtually all instances—as one would expect
given Illinois’ strong emphasis on deterrence.
Whatever the merits or demerits of the “interest-orexpectancy” and “fairness” approaches, these tests were not
embraced in Kerrigan or the subsequent Illinois Supreme Court
corporate opportunity decisions in Vendo Co. v. Stoner,109
Mullaney, Wells & Co. v. Savage,110 and Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v.
Gleason.111 Thus, the “fairness” discussion endorsed in the Illinois
Supreme Court’s pre-Kerrigan decision in Paulman112 (a case
decided under Delaware law in any event113), as well as the
“interest-or-expectancy” discussions found in the Illinois Supreme
Court’s pre-Kerrigan decision in Glasser and the Illinois Appellate
Court’s decision in Comedy Cottage114 (a case that also recited the
Paulman “good-faith” test while completely omitting any reference
to the Kerrigan “line-of-business” test), do not correctly state
modern Illinois corporate opportunity law.
The same is true of Northwestern Terra Cotta Corp. v.
Wilson115 and Peterson Welding Supply Co. v. Cryogas Products,

offsetting benefits”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 459-60 (1897) (“The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals,
and by the mere force of language continually invites us to pass from one
domain to the other without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we have
the boundary constantly before our minds.”); Michael Begert, Comment, The
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Outside Business Interests, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 827, 838 (1989) (“But, while a fairness test recognizes the inherently
subjective nature of the present corporate opportunity doctrine, it fails to
provide corporate participants with the guidance they need.”); with Joseph
William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 899, 915
(2009) (“[O]ur legal rules, traditions, customs, institutions, and precedents are
partially defined by moral principles, norms, and conceptions of a just society.
Normative concerns inevitably shape both social policy and interpretations of
precedent.”).
109. Vendo, 58 Ill. 2d at 305, 321 N.E.2d at 10 (discussing Kerrigan and the
corporate opportunity doctrine while noting the general discussion of fiduciary
duties of officers and directors in Paulman).
110. See Mullaney, 78 Ill. 2d at 548-49 (invoking Kerrigan corporate
opportunity rule and its “prophylactic purpose” rationale, without citation at
any point to Paulman).
111. Dowd, 181 Ill. 2d at 475-76, 693 N.E.2d at 358 (briefly discussing
corporate opportunity without citation to authority).
112. Paulman, 38 Ill. 2d 101, 230 N.E.2d 262.
113. The Illinois Supreme Court in Paulman specifically approved the
Illinois Appellate Court’s legal analysis, 230 N.E.2d at 263, which explicitly
applied Delaware corporate opportunity law to determine the fiduciary duties
owed to the Delaware corporation that had been victimized by its officer and
director, Kritzer. Paulman, 74 Ill. App. 2d at 289, 219 N.E.2d 543.
114. Comedy Cottage, Inc., 145 Ill. App. 3d at 355, 360, 495 N.E.2d at 1006,
1011.
115. Northwestern, 74 Ill. App. 2d at 46, 219 N.E.2d at 864 (citing no Illinois
Supreme Court case and adopting the “interest, actual or in expectancy” test).
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Inc.116 As the Illinois Appellate Court expressly pointed out in its
later decision in Levy v. Markal Sales Corp.,117 these two appellate
court decisions have serious shortcomings: Northwestern Terra
Cotta was decided before Kerrigan, and Peterson Welding Supply
relied upon pre-Kerrigan cases. Similar defects are also found in
Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker,118 in which the appellate court
combined the Paulman “good-faith” and Comedy Cottage “interestor-expectancy” tests, cited Northwestern Terra Cotta and Peterson
Welding Supply, and even quoted the Kerrigan “line-of-business”
test—all without recognizing that Kerrigan was controlling.
Unfortunately, this lack of doctrinal discipline still creeps into
Illinois corporate opportunity opinions from time to time, clouding
analysis with irrelevant issues and unnecessary facts and thereby
needlessly expanding and prolonging what otherwise should be
exceptionally straightforward litigation.119
116. Peterson Welding, 126 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764, 219 N.E.2d 860, 864 (citing
Kerrigan for the “line-of-business” test, but actually relying upon Paulman
and Northwestern Terra Cotta for the proposition that no fiduciary breach
occurs “where the alleged opportunity did not exist for the corporation to
obtain and utilize”).
117. Levy, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 355, 368, 643 N.E.2d 1206, 1216. In particular,
the Levy court commented as follows:
Gust and Bakal cite only two cases to support their argument. One was
decided before Kerrigan, Northwestern Terra Cotta Corp. v. Wilson, 74
Ill. App. 2d 38, 219 N.E.2d 860 (1966), and the other relies solely on
cases decided before 1968, Peterson Welding Supply Co. v. Cryogas
Products, Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 759, 467 N.E.2d 1068 (1st Dist. 1984). We
find both cases inapplicable here, and we will apply the law of Kerrigan
as explained in Vendo and Mullaney.
Id.
118. Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc., 154 Ill. App. 3d at 66-69, 506 N.E.2d at 64951.
119. See, e.g., Prodromos, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 725, 793 N.E.2d at 157
(reversing summary judgment grant in favor of defense without identifying
precise corporate opportunity test the court was employing), appeal following
remand, 389 Ill. App. 3d 157, 906 N.E.2d 599 (1st Dist. 2009) (second appeal,
after 6 years of additional litigation, concerning events that began 11 years
earlier in 1998—again with no specific corporate opportunity theory
identified); Delta Medical Systems, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 796-97, 772 N.E.2d
at 785 (rejecting corporate opportunity claim without citation to any corporate
opportunity decision or test); Goldberg, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 599, 766 N.E.2d at
251 (holding that “an element of the theory of usurpation of corporate
opportunity is the failure to first disclose the opportunity to the corporation”—
even though Kerrigan establishes no such “element” and Patient Care Services
holds that disclosure does not by itself preclude corporate opportunity
liability); Dremco, Inc., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 537-39, 654 N.E.2d at 504-05
(reciting correct formulation of “line-of-business” test derived from Kerrigan,
but then citing Lindenhurst Drugs and Peterson Welding Supply for erroneous
“capacity to engage” qualification, followed by erroneous recitation of “interestor-expectancy” test, and then ending with irrelevant statement that “capacity”
defense asks whether corporation was “unable to take advantage of the
opportunity for financial or legal reasons”).
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F. What Is “Corporate Competition”?
In contrast to corporate opportunity claims, corporate
competition charges do not present “what if” inquiries: the
corporate employer by definition already has an existing business
relationship with some third party or is actively seeking to
establish such a relationship, only to have its efforts thwarted by
its own employees seeking the same third-party business
relationship for themselves. Such pre-resignation unfair
competition may take the form of fiduciaries failing to inform their
employer that other employees are forming a rival company or
engaging in other fiduciary breaches;120 soliciting fellow employees
to join a rival business;121 soliciting customers to leave their
employer;122 using the corporation’s facilities or equipment to
assist them in developing their new business, or appropriating its
money or equipment for that purpose;123 using the corporation’s
confidential business information for their new business, either

120. Preferred Meal Systems, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 726, 557 N.E.2d at 515
(Singer and Reynolds breached their fiduciary duty to plaintiffs by not
informing them of “Guse’s and/or their own activities,” which included
orchestrating their mass departures to a rival concern); Unichem Corp. v.
Gurtler, 498 N.E.2d 724, 728 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (Unichem’s president,
Gurtler, breached his fiduciary duties by failing to advice Unichem of the
impending departures of his wife and son from Unichem to Gurtler
Chemicals).
121. Unichem, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 290, 498 N.E.2d at 728 (defendant William
Gurtler encouraged Lester Gurtler, one of Unichem’s employees, to leave
Unichem and join a rival business – Gurtler Chemicals—which William
Gurtler himself was going to join in the near future, and defendant William
Gurtler failed to inform Unichem’s other officers that his wife and son were
actively soliciting Unichem employees in an attempt to have them leave
Unichem and join Gurtler Chemicals).
122. Veco Corp. 243 Ill. App. 3d at 161, 611 N.E.2d at 1059-60 (former highranking officers of insurance broker solicited key customers prior to resigning,
as evidenced by six customer “broker of record” letters switching brokers
immediately after the officers resigned); Smith-Shrader Co., 136 Ill. App. 3d at
580, 483 N.E.2d at 290 (prior to resignation, officer solicited a customer
representing 85% of plaintiff’s business); H. Vincent Allen & Assoc. v. Weis, 63
Ill. App. 3d 285, 291, 379 N.E.2d 765, 769 (1st Dist. 1978) (prior to resignation,
defendant former vice-president actively sought key personnel and valuable
accounts of plaintiff).
123. Preferred Meal Systems, 199 Ill. App. at 716, 557 N.E.2d at 509 (officers
breached their fiduciary duties by using their employer’s data and computers
to prepare a business plan for their rival firm); Radiac Abrasives, Inc., 177 Ill.
App. 3d at 630, 638, 532 N.E.2d at 429, 434 (2d Dist. 1988) (key employees’
sale and immediate repurchase of their employer’s “used” equipment likely
constituted breach of fiduciary duty); ABC Trans National Transport, Inc. v.
Aeronautical Forwarders, Inc., 62 Ill. App. 3d 671, 683, 379 N.E.2d 1228, 1237
(1st Dist. 1978) (reciting the rule that it is a breach for a fiduciary to use “the
company’s facilities or equipment to assist him in developing his new business,
or [to appropriate] its money or equipment for that purpose”).
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before or after their departure;124 or orchestrating a mass exodus
of other employee’s before or shortly after the fiduciaries’ own
resignations from the corporation.125
And, of course, such fiduciary unfair competition can include
competition for a corporate opportunity, as in Vendo Co. v.
Stoner.126 There vending machine manufacturer Vendo caught its
president, Stoner, secretly financing a rival’s development of a
superior vending machine, the Lektro-Vend. After learning of the
Lektro-Vend’s debut at a trade show, Vendo instructed Stoner to
approach the Lekto-Vend’s owners about an acquisition. Stoner
found himself in an epic conflict of interest at that point: he “had a
foot in each camp.”127 Although the Illinois Supreme Court did not
employ the “corporate competition” label, the court certainly
appreciated that the problem at hand was competition—to be
precise, wrongful competition for a corporate opportunity, followed
by more wrongful competition armed with the stolen opportunity:
“In the present case, however, the acts of defendants in
misappropriating the Lektro-Vend and their use of it to compete
against plaintiff are intertwined, the latter being, so to speak, the
means by which the former was brought to bear against
plaintiff.”128
G. The “Head Start” Defense
Clearly, then, corporate competition cases can involve
diversion of a single deal with a permanent, mutually exclusive
outcome, such as when a fiduciary competes for a corporate
opportunity like Stoner did with respect to the Lektro-Vend in
Vendo. But more often corporate competition cases concern
fiduciaries who have gained an unfair head start in invading their
employer’s ongoing business relationship with a third party—say,
monthly sales of coal by their employer to a longstanding
customer. In almost all instances this ongoing employer/thirdparty relationship is terminable at will by either party, and as
such the wrongdoer might have legitimately won the customer’s
124. Affiliated Hospital Products, Inc. v. Baldwin, 57 Ill. App. 3d 800, 806,
373 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (1st Dist. 1978) (discussing the general rule prohibiting
fiduciaries from misappropriating confidential information).
125. ABC Trans National Transport, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 685, 379 N.E.2d at
1238 (noting defendant Brownstein’s admission that “plaintiff would be
destroyed by a massive walkout” of its employees, led by Brownstein and his
co-conspirators).
126. Vendo, 58 Ill. 2d at 304, 321 N.E.2d at 9 (“Assuming that plaintiff,
whether prudently or imprudently, failed to make the best use of Stoner’s
abilities [by relegating him to a “figurehead” role], such a failure certainly did
not release Stoner from his duty not to assume a position which would be
adverse to that of his employer.”).
127. Id. at 304, 321 N.E.2d at 9.
128. Id. at 306-07, 321 N.E.2d at 11.
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business in whole or in part at some point in the future, after
quitting the principal’s employ, through fair competition. This
eventual competition or “head start” defense, as it were, appeared
for example in ABC Transnational Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics
Forwarders, Inc.,129 where the court limited the victimized
employer’s recovery to four months of damages and four months of
salary forfeiture, on the theory that its disloyal employees could
have quit and competed legitimately after quitting, had they
chosen to do so.130
This “head start” remedy defense is irrelevant, by definition,
in corporate opportunity cases. Once the employer’s rights attach
under the “line-of-business” or “asset-misappropriation” tests, the
fiduciary is foreclosed from seizing the opportunity for himself—
period. The usurped building, real estate, technology or other
opportunity is turned over to the victimized corporation in toto
under constructive trust principles. This should be equally true if
the employer chooses simply to enjoin the fiduciary from seizing
the opportunity: the injunction should be broad in scope and
unlimited in time, in order to further the complete deterrence
policy of Illinois fiduciary duty law.131 After all, the loss of a single
–and wrongful—competitor from any market is de minimus, and
the court is merely being asked to vindicate the rights of the
company as against its fiduciary, not as against the world.132
129. See generally ABC Trans National Transport, Inc. 90 Ill. App. 3d 817,
413 N.E.2d 1299 (1st Dist. 1980).
130. But see Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 383, 388, 816 N.E.2d at
769, 774 (rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiff would have lost all of
customer Allstate’s business if defendant Gleason had resigned without
soliciting Allstate before her termination); Veco Corp., 243 Ill. App. 3d at 162,
611 N.E.2d at 1060 (rejecting “proximate cause” defense that Veco would have
lost its customer business, regardless of its employees’ fiduciary disloyalty via
pre-resignation customer solicitation, because employees “could have left
Veco’s employ at any time”).
131. Compare LCOR Inc., 1997 WL 136278 (granting preliminary injunction
without time limit to bar fiduciary from seizing real estate opportunity);
Comedy Cottage, Inc., 145 Ill. App. 3d at 362, 495 N.E.2d at 1012 (granting
preliminary injunction without time limit to bar fiduciary from interfering
with real estate lease he tried to usurp), with Durasys, Inc. v. Leyba, 992 F.2d
1465, 1471 (7th Cir. 1993) (denying permanent injunction to prevent
usurpation of City of Chicago airport computerized parking system contract;
public interest in parking trumped private interest in loyalty); Regal-Beloit
Corp., 955 F. Supp. at 867 (granting preliminary injunction to bar fiduciaries
from seizing business acquisition opportunity, but limiting the injunction to 6
months on the theory that fiduciaries could have legitimately quit and then
sought the opportunity for themselves); Allstate Amusement Co. of Illinois,
Inc. v. Pasinato, 96 Ill. App. 3d 306, 309-10, 421 N.E.2d 374 (1st Dist. 1981)
(denying preliminary injunctive relief to preclude usurpation of lease, holding
that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law).
132. Compare Kerrigan, 11 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 297 N.E.2d at 704
(“Therefore, the business opportunity in the sale of this insurance belonged to
Unity. As against the individual defendants, its directors and officers, this
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H. The “Preparing to Compete” Defense
Despite their general similarity, corporate opportunity and
corporate competition cases also differ with respect to another key
defense: “preparing to compete.” An employee or other agent may
legitimately take certain preparatory steps during the agency
relationship, such as recruiting potential employees, securing a
lease or loan, buying equipment, or even purchasing a rival
business, as these preliminary activities do not normally amount
to competition or otherwise bring employees or agents into direct
conflict with their principal.133 Such seemingly innocuous
“preparation” becomes wrongful “competition,” however, if the
employer is seeking to employ the same person,134 to obtain the
same lease or loan,135 to buy the same equipment,136 or to acquire
the same rival business.137
The interplay between “preparation” and corporate
opportunity law is more subtle. Unlike corporate competition
cases, in which employees invariably know they are undercutting
their employer’s interests by diverting to themselves the very
business their employer holds or is seeking, some corporate
opportunity cases present situations in which employees doubt
their employer would be interested in or able to pursue the
opportunity. For example, a new technology or a nearby building
might not seem necessary or suitable to their employer’s business,
or their employer might be in financial straits, so employees might
business interest was protected by the doctrine of corporate opportunity.”)
with Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104, 110 (7th Cir.
1936) (“We are dealing here not with Allen-Qualley’s [trade secret] right
against the world, but with that company’s right against appellant”) and Pidot
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 308 Ill. App. 197, 215, 31 N.E.2d 385, 393 (1st Dist.
1941) (“We agree with the contention of plaintiffs that the basis of recovery is
breach of confidence and that it is not necessary for plaintiffs to establish that
their design was new and novel as against the world.”).
133. Alpha Sch. Bus Co., Inc. v. Wagner, 391 Ill. App. 3d 722, 736, 910
N.E.2d 1134, 1149 (1st Dist. 2009) (“[E]mployees may plan, form, and outfit a
competing business while still working for their employer.”).
134. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 181 Ill. 2d at 476, 693 N.E.2d at 367 (employees
usurped corporate opportunity in recruiting for themselves the same people
their employer was interviewing).
135. Mullaney, Wells & Co., 78 Ill. 2d 534, 402 N.E.2d 574 (ex-employee
usurped corporate opportunity in providing combined debt and equity
financing to firm his employer had unsuccessfully tried to provide debt
financing).
136. Radiac Abrasives, 177 Ill. App. 3d 628, 532 N.E.2d 428 (employees’ sale
of their employer’s equipment to used equipment dealer, followed by their
immediate repurchase of the same equipment for their own use in their secret
start-up, constituted potential breach of fiduciary duty).
137. Regal-Beloit Corp., 955 F. Supp. at 864 (defendants went beyond mere
“preparation” and in fact were “competing” with their employer when they
sought to purchase rival gear business they knew their employer wanted to
acquire).
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begin investigating the opportunity before resigning, without
raising the subject with their employer, and then complete the
deal for themselves after quitting. This was in fact Savage’s
argument in Mullaney: his employer had never done a transaction
the size of his option deal with third party Blossman,138 the
pursuit of which Savage characterized as mere “preparation” since
he resigned from Mullaney, Wells & Co. the day before exercising
the Blossman options.139 While such employee activities may be
“preparatory” in some sense, the “line-of-business” test does not
ask whether employees acted in good faith or whether their
employer was actively seeking the opportunity; in fact, the Illinois
Supreme Court explicitly deemed both of these inquiries irrelevant
in Kerrigan itself.140 The “line-of-business” test instead asks
whether the opportunity was reasonably incident to their
employer’s present or prospective business and, if so, whether the
employees disclosed and tendered the opportunity. If satisfied, the
corporate opportunity doctrine transforms “preparation” into
“usurpation” in these circumstances—precisely the result that
obtained in Mullaney.
More subtle still is the “asset-misappropriation” test’s
potential application to “preparation.” If corporate assets are used
during “preparation,” departing employees are foreclosed from
contesting the corporate opportunity doctrine’s application under

138. Mullaney, 78 Ill. 2d at 549, 402 N.E.2d at 582.
139. Supreme Court Brief of Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Savage, at
120-121:
The law has long recognized, not only that an agent may make personal
investments, but also that an agent may take actions in furtherance of
his anticipated business objectives preparatory to his departure form
employment. Thus, in James C. Wilborn & Sons, Inc. v. Heniff, 95 Ill.
App. 2d 155 (1st Dist. 1968), Heniff purchased machinery, set up his
factory and otherwise participated in setting up his organization in
order to compete with Wilborn (his employer) in the manufacture of
sliding windows. The court declared that it was not a breach of duty for
an agent to form a rival concern and to make preparations to this end
while still in the employ of his principal (95 Ill. App. 2d at 163). In no
way was Savage setting up a rival investment banking business when
securing an option to purchase the stock held by the Blossman family in
the Blossman gas company.
140. See Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 28, 317 N.E.2d at 43 (“Defendants stress
their belief that Unity could not have legally engaged in the [insurance]
business. But that belief, assuming it was held in 1962 [at the time of the
usurpation], cannot operate as a substitute for defendants’ duty to present the
question to Unity for Unity’s independent evaluation.”). The Illinois Supreme
Court later reiterated this important holding in Mullaney, 78 Ill. 2d at 549,
402 N.E.2d at 581-82 (“It is not an answer to state, as does the appellate court,
that there is no evidence that the plaintiff either ‘contemplated’ or ‘would have
desired to make’ a stock purchase of this magnitude. That is a decision to be
made by the plaintiff upon disclosure of the pertinent facts.”).
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equitable estoppel principles, as Graham v. Mimms illustrates.141
Indeed, under Graham, if corporate assets are used, the doctrine’s
application is automatic even if the opportunity falls outside the
employer’s line of business and even if it is not feasible for the
corporation to pursue the opportunity.142 All too often employees
use their employer’s information, equipment, or personnel to
develop an opportunity as part of their pre-resignation
“preparation,” thereby opening the door to corporate opportunity
liability. Even if an employee avoids these pitfalls, potential
opportunity usurpation liability can still arise if he simply uses his
employer’s time to “prepare.” Thus, when corporate assets are
misused, “preparing” becomes “stealing” from a corporate
opportunity perspective.
I.

Summary Determinations

Properly understood, the pro-plaintiff configuration of Illinois
fiduciary duty law allows, if not compels, summary determinations
in plaintiff’s favor in many corporate opportunity and corporate
competition cases.143 A number of decisions reflect this reality.
First among equals is Kerrigan itself. Courts and
commentators seldom note the procedural aspects of that case,
which came to the Illinois Supreme Court on cross-motions for
summary judgment, the defendants’ motion having been granted.
The court opened its opinion with a careful analysis of the
complaint’s factual allegations that the defendant-directors
admitted in their answer. Among these admissions were (i) that
the defendants controlled Unity’s affairs, (ii) that defendants’
insurance agency, Plaza, had its offices in the same building as
Unity under a lease from Unity, (iii) that Unity “referred” its
borrowers to Plaza to obtain fire, homeowner’s and other
insurance in connection with loans made by Unity, and (iv) that
Plaza’s articles of incorporation authorized Plaza to make loans on
the same terms as Unity, though Plaza had not done so.144 Given
these admissions, the defendants principally relied upon their
affirmative defense that Unity lacked the authority to write
insurance and that Unity in fact was forbidden by law from doing
141. See Graham, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 763, 444 N.E.2d at 557 (“[W]hen a
corporation’s fiduciary uses corporate assets to develop a business opportunity,
the fiduciary is estopped from denying that the resulting opportunity belongs
to the corporation whose assets were misappropriated, even if it was not
feasible for the corporation to pursue the opportunity or it had no expectancy
in the project.”).
142. Id.
143. The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure permits summary determinations
of discrete issues. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1005(a)-(b), (d). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also permit summary determinations of
discrete issues. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)-(b), (d).
144. Kerrigan, 58 Ill. 2d at 23-24, 317 N.E.2d at 41.
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so.145 After offering its “line-of-business” holding and determining
that Unity was permitted to write insurance, the Illinois Supreme
Court seized upon the key admissions in the defendants’ answer
and ruled that “in the view we take of this case, the question of
defendants’ liability is established on the basis of the pleadings
and no trial is required.”146 Remand was therefore expressly
limited to “ascertain[ing] the amounts to which the plaintiff is
entitled and to determin[ing] what other relief should be
granted.”147
Just days after deciding Kerrigan, the Illinois Supreme Court
handed down its second and even more procedurally extraordinary
fiduciary duty decision in Vendo. As noted, that case arose when
Vendo learned its president, Stoner, had been secretly financing a
rival firm even as Vendo was asking him to acquire that firm for
Vendo. The litigation finally reached the Illinois Supreme Court
after two trials and two lower court appeals. The first Illinois
Appellate Court opinion resulted in rejection of trade secret claims
and reversal of a $1.1 million non-compete damages award against
Stoner,148 although the court found salary forfeiture appropriate
for Stoner’s in-term non-compete violation.149 The second Illinois
Appellate Court opinion again ended with a reversal in Stoner’s
favor on the non-compete damages award (which had ballooned to
$7.3 million on remand); this time the appellate court concluded
Vendo had not shown Stoner’s misconduct had caused Vendo’s
losses.150 Unhappy with this result, the Illinois Supreme Court
allowed Vendo to amend its pleadings before that court to allege a
breach of fiduciary duty claim as the basis for liability,151 and the
supreme court then proceeded to affirm the $7.3 million dollar
145. Id. at 24, 317 N.E.2d at 42.
146. Id. at 32, 317 N.E.2d at 45.
147. Id. at 31-32, 317 N.E.2d at 45.
148. See Vendo, 105 Ill. App. 2d at 278-92, 245 N.E.2d at 271-79 (citing case
history and trade secret determinations).
149. Id. at 288-90, 245 N.E.2d at 277 (the court attributed Stoner’s salary
forfeiture to his breach of “fiduciary undertaking”); see also id. at 288, 245
N.E.2d at 277. This offhand characterization was clearly just a description of
Stoner’s in-term covenant contract breach, as the court made a point of saying
earlier in its opinion that Vendo had originally sued Stoner for breach of his
non-compete agreement and then amended its complaint to add a claim for
trade secret theft. Id. at 277, 245 N.E.2d at 271.
150. See Vendo, 13 Ill. App. 3d at 293-95, 300 N.E.2d at 634-35 (explaining
how the misconduct was not responsible for the losses and stating that
“[n]either the evidence in the first trial nor in the trial on remand establishes
that Stoner was responsible for Vendo’s failure to have FIFO.”).
151. See Vendo, 58 Ill. 2d at 307, 321 N.E.2d at 11. Although the second
appellate court opinion did not mention it, according to the Supreme Court,
Vendo had sought on remand to amend its complaint to include a fiduciary
duty claim. See also id. (“We are not confronted here with the situation in
which a litigant attempts to interject on appeal a theory never addressed in
the trial court. Plaintiff made its theory quite explicit in the trial on remand.”).
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judgment and a $170,000 salary forfeiture award against Stoner
solely on fiduciary duty grounds—despite a complete change in
theory and without so much as a remand.152
Of a piece with Kerrigan and Vendo was the procedural
outcome in Mullaney. A master in chancery found Savage guilty of
usurping a corporate opportunity in diverting to himself the
Blossman transaction that he originated while still employed by
Mullaney, Wells & Co. The trial court sustained exceptions to the
master’s report and entered judgment for the defense, and the
appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected
Savage’s various defenses on appeal but did not remand for
further proceedings. Instead, the Supreme Court reversed the trial
and appellate courts and remanded the case with instructions to
the trial court “to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff.”153
Patient Care Services yielded an equally pro-plaintiff outcome
from a procedural standpoint. Plaintiff sought to renew its
emergency room services with a hospital, only to find its own
fiduciary seeking—and winning—the very same contract for
himself. This head-to-head competition for a corporate opportunity
resulted in a trial that somehow ended in judgment for the
defense. The Illinois Appellate Court did not simply reverse the
trial court’s defense judgment. The appellate court went much
further: it entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and then
remanded the case with directions to the trial court “to impress a
constructive trust on the business assets of defendants and to
order an accounting in accordance with the views expressed in this
opinion.”154
While Kerrigan was a pure corporate opportunity case, and
while Vendo, Mullaney and Patient Care Services presented
combination corporate opportunity/corporate competition cases,
the same pro-plaintiff result can be found in the pure corporate
competition opinion in Unichem. The court there had no difficulty
in determining that Gurtler, as Unichem’s president, was in a
fiduciary relationship with the firm.155 In turning his back on
Unichem while his son diverted company assets to a rival, Gurtler
obviously breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty as a matter of law.
The trial court so ruled in granting summary judgment in favor of
Unichem on liability and ordering an accounting, and the Illinois
Appellate Court readily affirmed this summary judgment on
appeal.156

152. Id. at 314, 321 N.E.2d at 15.
153. Mullaney, 402 N.E.2d at 582.
154. Patient Care Servs., 32 Ill. App. 3d at 1034, 337 N.E.2d at 482.
155. See Unichem, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 290, 498 N.E.2d at 727-28 (the court
entered a summary judgment that Gurtler had breached his fiduciary duty).
156. Id. at 297, 498 N.E.2d at 732.
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Hill v. Names and Addresses, Inc.,157 another pure corporate
competition case, also ended in summary judgment for plaintiff, or
more precisely, the counter-plaintiff. Hill sued her former
employer, Names and Addresses, for compensation, prompting
Names and Addresses to counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Hill’s conduct rivaled Gurtler’s for outrageousness: before
resigning she solicited six customers who immediately followed her
to her new employer. The trial court found Hill breached her
fiduciary duty of loyalty as a matter of law in soliciting her
employer’s customers prior to her resignation. The trial court
therefore entered summary judgment against Hill on
compensation forfeiture, and the Illinois Appellate Court later
affirmed this procedural ruling.158
Implicit in each of these cases is another key procedural
point: the courts thought proximate cause, warranting at least
some relief, existed in these cases as a matter of law, or the courts
thought proximate cause was irrelevant in these cases as a matter
of policy. Kerrigan and Patient Care Services both ordered
remands for an accounting and other relief, the courts having
concluded that the defendants were at a minimum required to
disgorge the gains they obtained through their undisputed
diversions of business from their principals. Vendo arrived before
the Illinois Supreme Court with proven losses but the wrong
theory, yet no remand was necessary, the court evidently believing
that proximate cause existed as to a theory the jury did not even
consider. Similarly, Mullaney ended with the Illinois Supreme
Court reversing the trial and appellate courts and entering
judgment in favor of plaintiff on the $800,000 restitution claim
therein without remand. And Hill and Unichem both recognized
that at least some recovery was appropriate on summary
judgment—salary forfeiture in Hill and damages on diverted
customer business in Unichem.
All of these opinions should be understood as standing for a
well-established but seldom cited principle: proximate cause “may
be determined as a matter of law when the facts not only are
undisputed but allow no difference in the judgment of reasonable
men as to the inferences to be drawn therefrom.”159 Indeed, in
many if not most corporate opportunity and corporate competition
cases—and certainly in all cases where a fiduciary competes for a
corporate opportunity his principal is actually seeking—liability,
proximate cause, disgorgement and compensation forfeiture
should all exist as a matter of law because the legally operative
facts are undisputed and reasonable minds cannot differ as to the

157. Hill, 212 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 571 N.E.2d at 1085.
158. Id. at 1075-77, 571 N.E.2d at 1091-92.
159. Prodromos, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 727-28, 793 N.E.2d at 159.
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inferences to be drawn.
Given this pro-plaintiff procedural vortex created by
Kerrigan, Vendo and Mullaney, fiduciaries who fail to meet the
disclosure, tender and consent criteria have almost nowhere to go.
They can try to argue that they weren’t fiduciaries for the
opportunity in question, or that the opportunity was not within
the corporation’s line of business, but these are seldom successful
in traditional cases involving officers and key employees. And even
these weak defenses disappear when a fiduciary competes for a
corporate opportunity: on these facts, the corporation has
demonstrated its actual interest in the opportunity by
affirmatively pursuing it, thereby automatically bringing the
opportunity within the corporation’s line of business. In these
scenarios, fiduciaries have only one place to retreat: the friendly
testimony of the very customers or other third parties they have
diverted—the third-party “refusal to deal” defense. And retreat to
them they do, early and often, in case after case, as I will
demonstrate in my next article focusing on the chronological
evolution of Illinois corporate opportunity opinions and the
decisive roles third parties played in so many of those cases.160
III. CONCLUSION
It’s easy to say fiduciary duties are important; it’s not so easy
to distinguish among the many branches of fiduciary duty law. All
are powerful, but they vary significantly in application and
outcome, not to mention enforcement. Corporate opportunity and
corporate competition clams epitomize these nuances due to their
considerable overlap in life and law.
Corporate opportunity charges, however, are particularly
dangerous: they can arise in unexpected circumstances, and they
cannot be easily defeated short of trial. Indeed, quite the opposite
is true—corporate opportunity complaints can result in quick
determinations in favor of plaintiffs, forcing defendants to account
fully for their misconduct and to pay a hefty price commensurate
with this bedrock deterrence law. Should a defendant be allowed
to escape this regime simply by calling friendly third parties as
witnesses to say, after-the-fact, that they never liked plaintiff
anyway? Not if the Illinois experience has anything to teach, and
not if Illinois policy and practice matter, as I argue, respectively,
in my next two articles in this series.161

160. Schaller, supra note 17.
161. Id.; Schaller, supra note 18.
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